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Theory of a Medical Malpractice Action-Time
Limitations and Damages
When a patient institutes an action against a physician or sur-
geon for improper treatment, the legal theory under which he
proceeds may determine whether a statute of limitations will act
as a bar, and further, the damages, if any, to which he is entitled.'
All such actions against physicians are not, in the true sense of
the word, malpractice actions although they are frequently re-
ferred to as such. Malpractice is predicated upon the failure to
use the required medical care and skill and is tortious in nature,
whereas an action in contract arises from the physician's failure
to perform a special agreement.' However, both a malpractice
action and an action based on breach of an express contract may
arise from the same transaction.3 But there are, between the two
actions, dissimilarities as to theory, proof and damages recover-
able;' and, of course, the time limitations would vary.' As might
be expected, the distinctions between the two actions are not
always clear.6 Aside from the situation where the action is based
upon the physician's breach of a special contract there is some
variance as to the theory of the action resulting in a problem re-
garding the applicable statute of limitations. As an aid to the
understanding of the bases of these distinctions it would be well
to examine the nature of the physician-patient relationship.
Disregarding the situation where there is a special contract to
effect a cure,' the duty of a physician to exercise ordinary skill
and care in the treatment of his patient's ailment arises not only
from an implied contract, but also from the status which is created
by this singular relationship.' The physician-patient relationship
' No attempt will be made to discuss the substantive law relating to
medical malpractice actions. For an able discussion of the law in West
Virginia on this subject see Posten, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West
Virginia, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 35 (1934).
2 Lakeman v. La France, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Colvin
v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949).
' Colvin v. Smith, supra note 2.4 Lakeman v. La France, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Colvin v.
Smith, supra note 2.
5 It should be noted that the time from which the statute begins to run
may vary depending upon the circumstances. See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d
368 (1961); Comment, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 103 (1961).
6 See Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
7 Contracts of this nature are unusual because the practice of medicine is
not an exact science. Id. at 546, 127 N.E.2d at 331.
8 Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955); Kennedy
v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
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is usually considered to be more consensual in nature than con-
tractual. However, in the usual situation, the two ideas of the
relationship are inextricably bound together.9 But, because of
the "status which results from the circumstance of physician treat-
ing patient, the former is under a duty, imposed by law, to the
latter to apply his skill and ability in a reasonably careful manner."0
Thus, superimposed upon the duty arising from the implied contract
is the obligation imposed by law. Generally the duty imposed by
law is over and above the duty arising out of the contractual re-
lationship." In support of the view that the legal duty takes
precedence, it might be said that this duty is always present where-
as the contractual duty may not exist.'2 However, in the usual case
where physician treats patient undoubtedly the implied contract
concept is present. Thus, where the medical practitioner breaches
his duty the problem may arise with respect to what statute of
limitations is applicable. Can the plaintiff elect to bring his mal-
practice action either under the implied contract or under the
duty imposed by law? And, will the theory under which the
plaintiff proceeds provide the solution?
Under the prevailing view it will make little difference whether
the plaintiff pleads a breach of implied contract, or simply neg-
ligent treatment. The majority view is probably represented by
those jurisdictions which hold that an action against a physician
for unskillful treatment resulting in injury is tortious in nature,
and therefore subject to the limitation period for tort actions,' 3
or the period provided in specific statutes relating to medical mal-
practice.' 4 The courts adhering to this view state that the gravamen
of the action is the negligent act which causes the injury.' 5 The
court will look behind the form of the complaint and determine
the applicable statute of limitations by the substance of the allega-
tions.' 6 Thus, in Trimming v. Howard,'7 where the two year statute
of limitations for torts was applied, the court stated that "the basic
91bid.
10 Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1959).
11 Ibid.
12For example, there is no implied contractual relationship where the
patient is incapable of contracting, or where a third person has contracted
with the physician for the treatment of the patient. Ibid.
13 Ibid.; Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 320 (1961).
14Barnhoff v. Aldridge 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
1s Id. at 771, 38 S.W.2d at 1030.
'6Trmming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932); Lakeman
v. La France, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959).
1752 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932).
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allegations of the complaint are directed solely to . . .negligence
... as the proximate cause of the injury .... Respondent is not
arraigned for breach of contract, but for delinquencies incidental
to its performance .. . these are the very foundation of the action,
and if true constituted nothing but malpractice .... " Thus the
view obtains that a malpractice action is tortious in nature and
therefore barred by the tort or malpractice time limitation, whether
only mere negligence is alleged'" or whether the negligence con-
stituting a breach of implied contract is pleaded.'9
In Kozan v. Comstock,2" the court stated that "It is the nature
of the duty breached that should determine whether the action
is in tort or contract." Contractual relation or not, the physician
is under a duty to use due care in treating his patient, and a breach
of this duty constitutes a tort. "On principle then", the court de-
clared, "We consider a malpractice action as tortious in nature
... "21 However, the court recognized that a contractual action
may lie against a physician where, for instance, he has expressly
agreed to effect a cure.
22
However, even where the plaintiff-patient pleads the breach of
an express contract the action may be subject to the statute of
limitations provided for tort or malpractice actions. Thus, in
Barnhoff v. Aldridge,2" the court dismissed plaintiffs contention
that the action was for breach of an express contract. Even though
the plaintiff pleaded language "suitable to the statement of a
cause of action on contract" and did not allege negligence, the
court stated that the gist of the action was the defendant's wrong-
fil act, and held that the two year statute of limitations barring all
actions against physicians for malpractice was applicable.24 A
18 Calvin v. Thayer, 150 Cal. App. 2d 610, 310 P.2d 59 (1957).
19 Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932); Travis v.
Bishoff, 143 Kan. 283, 54 P.2d 955 (1936).
20 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
21 Id. at 845.
22 Ibid.
23 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
24 The court stated that "The limitation is not determined by the form
of the action, but by its object. The improper performance by a physician...
of the duties devolved and incumbent upon him and the services undertaken
by him, whether same be said to be under a contractual relationship with the
patient arising out of either an express or implied contract or the obligation
imposed by law under a consensual relationship, whereby the patient is
injured in body and health, is malpractice, and any action for damages,
regardless of the form thereof, based upon such improper act comes within
the inhibition of the two year statute of limitation." Id. at 771, 38 S.W.2d at
1030. See Mo. STAT. ANN. § 516.140 (1952).
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similar result was reached in Lakeman v. La France," where the
plaintiff in his first count alleged that the defendant negligently
treated him for a broken hip, and in his second count in assumpsit
alleged the existence of a special contract to cure and heal the hip
in a proper manner, and that the defendant breached this contract
by unskillfully treating the hip. While the court declared that the
two year statute of limitations applicable to a tort for malprac-
tice did not apply to an action of assumpsit for breach of con-
tract, they stated that substance, and not form, was controlling.
Finding that the gist of the second count was the defendant's
wrongful act-unskilled treatment-the court held the two year
limitations statute barred the action.
However, a result contrary to that reached in the Barnhoff6 and
Lakeman27 cases was announced in Robins v. Finestone." Here
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-physician breached an ex-
press contract to remove a growth by fulguration-an operation
not involving an incision of the abdominal wall. Due to the al-
legedly unskillful manner in which the physician performed the
fulguration a major operation requiring incision became neces-
sary. A majority of the court held that "the gist of the action here
is defendant's failure to perform his promise to cure plaintiff within
a specified time by a specified method."29 Also, the damages
sought being those suitable to an action on contract helped char-
acterize the action as one based on a contract. The two dissenting
judges voted to affirm the determination of the lower courts that
the gravamen of the complaint was in malpractice, an action
barred by the statute of limitations.
While the Barnhoff and LakemanP' cases indicate that it
may be of no avail to sue on an express contract in order to avoid
the bar of the statute of limitations, the Robins2 case does afford
some comfort to the injured patient seeking to recover on such a
contract where his action otherwise would be barred.
Contrasted to those jurisdictions holding that a malpractice
action is subject to the time limitations provided for tort or mal-
25 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959).
26 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
27 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959).
28 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
29Id. at 547, 127 N.E.2d at 332.
30 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
3, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959).
32 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
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practice actions are those holding that the contract statute of
limitations governs where the action purports to be one for breach
of contract.3 Not only does this appear to be the minority view,
but there is apparently a trend away from this position.14 In an
early Alabama decision,"5 representative of this view, the plaintiff
sued the defendant for breach of contract in performing an
appendectomy. The breach consisted of negligently leaving a
needle or portion thereof in the plaintiffs body. In holding that the
tort statute of limitations was not applicable, the court said that
the reference to negligence in the complaint only described the
manner in which the contract was breached.
Probably the leading West Virginia case in this area is Kuhn
v. Brownfield, 6 wherein it is stated that either assumpsit or trespass
on the case will lie against a physician where he has failed to
exercise proper skill in the treatment of a patient. However, the
court stated that the gist of the action is the negligence of the
defendant, and the implied contract "is only explanatory of how
he came to be engaged, and as raising a duty on his part, and is to
be treated as if it were inducement.""' The court also stated that
the same is true where the defendant-physician is engaged under
a special contract to effect a cure and he breaches the contract by
rendering unskillful or negligent treatment.3
Regardless of the form of the action however, the court
stated that it was subject to the one year statute of limitations. 9
Although under present West Virginia practice forms of action
are abolished,' * this change in procedure would have no effect
upon the time limitation to be applied in a malpractice action. It is
readily seen that West Virginia is in accord with the majority view,
at least insofar as the application of the statute of limitations is
concerned. More recent malpractice actions barred by the one year
33 Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923); Burke v. Mayland,
149 Minn. 481, 184 N.W. 32 (1921).34 Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 320, 339 n. 15 (1961).
35 Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923).
36 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890).3
7 Id. at 257, 12 S.E. at 521.38 Ibid.
39 "The action, though connected with an implied contract is for a tort
or wrong resulting in bodily suffering and injury, and would not survive the
death of the party injured either under our statute or the common-law, and is
thus limited to one year." Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 260, 12 S.E.
519, 522 (1890).
40 W. VA. R.C.P. 2.
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statute of limitations" are Pickett v. Aglinsky42 and Gray v.
Wright.
4 3
Damages recoverable in an action against a physician based
on breach of contract are quite different from those recoverable
in an action for malpractice. 44 In a malpractice action the plaintiff-
patient may recover damages for personal injuries, including pain
and suffering, which proximately result from the tortious act of the
defendant-physician.4 Thus in a malpractice suit the plaintiff is
entitled to compensation for loss of time, impaired earning capacity
and other consequential damages. 6
Where the action is in contract, based upon the physician's
failure to perform a special agreement, the plaintiff is entitled to
"only the difference between the value of the condition promised
and the actual condition, including incidental consequences fairly
subject to contemplation by the parties when the contract is
made."47 Thus the patient in a contract action is restricted in his
recovery to payments made to the defendant-physician, expendi-
tures necessitated for medicine and nursing and "those other
damages which naturally flow from the breach of the contract."
4
It is generally held that in an action based on contract damages are
not recoverable for loss of earnings49 or for pain and suffering.50
41 W. VA. CoDE ch. 55, art. 2, § 12 (Michie 1961). The pertinent language
of this statute provides: "Every personal action for which no limitation is
otherwise prescribed shall be brought: ... (b) within two years next after
the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal
injuries; and (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall
have accrued if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a
party die, it could not have been brought at common law by or against his
personal representative." Prior to the extensive amendment of this statute in
1959 it provided a two year limitation on personal actions which survived the
death of a party, and if it did not survive, the limitation period was one year.
It would seem that a malpractice action, being an action for damages for
personal injuries, would be governed by subsection (b) of the present statute
and thus not be barred if brought within two years.
42 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940).
43 142W. Va. 490, 96 S.E.2d 671 (1957).44 Lakeman v. La France, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Colvin v.
Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949); Miller, The Contractual
Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 413, 423-24.
45 Lakeman v. La France, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Colvin v.
Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949).46 Miller, supra note 44, at 424.4 7 McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 303, 157 Ad. 881, 883 (1932).4 8Hertgen v. Weintraub, 29 Misc. 2d 396, 215 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct.
1961).49 McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 Ad. 881 (1932).
50 Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 AUt. 641 (1929); Miller, supra
note 44, at 424.
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However, damages for pain and suffering have been allowed in a
contract action, the court stating that under the circumstances pain
and suffering might fairly be said to have been within the
contemplation of the parties-when the contract was madeO One
writer, agreeing with the holding in the above case, favors the
allowance of damages for pain and suffering and other damages
allowable in tort actions, in an action based on breach of contract
where the factual situation is appropriate.52
In summation, it is apparent that for a plaintiff-patient a
malpractice action has an advantage over an action for breach
of contract with respect to the measure of damages, but as concerns
the statute of limitations the reverse is true, for normally there
is a longer period in which to commence a contract action. Of course,
for the defendant-physician the situation is reversed. The caveat
is patent: it is incumbent on the patient not to sit on his cause of
action otherwise it may be barred. The numerous malpractice
cases wherein the statute of limitations has been applied not only
indicate that it is an oft-used defense, but that the plaintiff has
frequently waited too long. Possibly the circumstances may be
such as to toll the running of the statute. But, if not, the paucity of
decisions permitting an action to be based on a contractual
obligation give notice of the inexpediency of such course.
Peter Uriah Hook
-, Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957).
52 Miller, supra note 44, at 428.
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